Money matters in Thai politics, especially at elections. That's not true solely of Thailand, and it does not imply that the Thai voter is a simpleton easily bought. But where the money comes from and where it goes is very important. At the upcoming election, there will be three big purses at play: business, the junta, and "London".

Business has traditionally been the major source for funding elections. The Thai Rak Thai Party was a joint investment by a coalition of top business families. As TRT has failed to deliver what its backers hoped, the investment will become more scattered.

At its recent fund-raiser, the Democrat Party raised Bt427 million, mostly from business donors. In July, the Democrats disclosed donations of Bt100 million to the Election Commission. The largest sum of Bt23 million came from the CP Group, one of Thailand's largest conglomerates and formerly an open supporter of Thaksin. Thailand's modern business is plumping for the Democrats.

But the next largest benefactor of the Democrats was the Sahaviriya steel group (Bt10 million) and the Trivision ad hoarding company (Bt9 million). The rest came in driblets from relatively little known firms. A Democrat leader was overheard saying recently, "Nowadays there are few deep pockets." Many former donors were wiped out by the 1997 crisis. The banks are no longer generous. Some business groups will give to all sides in order to be sure of having the future government in their debt, and these gifts will be invisible. Even so, the business purse will not be huge this time.

How much does Thaksin have, and what might he be prepared to invest in this election? In 2001, before politics made his wealth more obscure, Thaksin was valued by Forbes at US$1.2 billion. Most of those assets were in the Thai stock market which subsequently tripled in value, or in land which also inflated. The Shinawatra family's share of Shin Corp profits from 2001 to 2005 was around US$1 billion. Other known investments (SC Asset, hospitals, etc) yielded at least another quarter billion. Without allowing for offshore holdings and other hidden wealth, that sum adds up to at least US$5 billion. Less than US$2 billion has either been frozen or invested in Manchester City. He still has a lot on hand.

Thaksin has a powerful incentive to invest in this election to counter the judicial assault. How much is it worth investing to regain almost US$2 billion, and perhaps home and freedom too? Remember, Thaksin is a high-risk, high-return player.

What about the junta? The generals feel justified investing in politics to block Thaksin. After the coup they earmarked a budget of half a billion baht to overturn support for Thaksin at the grassroots. By the same logic, spending to prevent any return of Thaksin's influence at the upcoming election will seem imperative. The outcome of the constitution referendum will have increased estimates of the funding needed. General Montri Sankhasap blamed the huge No vote in the Northeast squarely on the military failure to spend: "If we can help them fight off poverty, they will likely switch to our side." Abolishing poverty in four months is even more ambitious than Thaksin claimed he could do.

The military has an increased budget and a fatter secret fund, but that is not all. The military's monopolistic control on broadcast media delivers a large income. The squeeze on TOT suggests a return to the old habit of leveraging control over state enterprises.

On top, the junta has access to other state resources. In the referendum campaign, public money paid for the mass rallies and the police raids to disrupt the opposition campaign. Consider the referendum result in Buri Ram, stronghold of Thaksin's ally, Newin Chidchob. During the run-up to the poll, several Chidchob projects underwent an unusual level of harassment. Four cases of irregularities over land were sent for investigation. A recently erected statue of King Rama I was alleged to be an affront to the whole Chakri dynasty. Buri Ram teachers who campaigned for a No vote were publicly reprimanded. Such official harassment works wonders. In Buri Ram, the vote went 55:45. Just next door in Yasothon, it was 30:70. The Army has since murmured about using the "Buri Ram model" at the general election. So the big purses belong to Thaksin and the junta.

Money is needed to run election campaigns, and to reward voters for their participation. But the big spending is higher up the political food chain, in deals over party loyalty. In this market, two key things have recently happened. First, the removal of 111 politicians has raised the scarcity value of those remaining. Some figures whose political stock seemed so depreciated that they commanded only scrap value are now back in the market. Second, the end of TRT's monopoly and the higher level of uncertainty has increased competitiveness. Prices will be up. Banharn said the current transfer fee is Bt30 million. He should know.

Three major camps are taking shape: the Democrats with Chart Thai; the People Power Party (PPP) as Thaksin's nominee; and a bunch of factions slowly coalescing into the Yam Yai Party. Most are former TRT members who have turned to the military for protection.

These three camps will probably dominate the parliament. But at this stage it is pointless to estimate their likely shares, because that still remains to be decided. Transfer activity began before the referendum vote. Soon it will heat up.

After the referendum vote, the junta can see that the Democrats alone will not be able to block PPP. Besides, the Democrats have neither the funds nor the inclination to participate openly in the transfer market. But the Democrats plus the Yam Yai Party could block PPP. And the Yam Yai Party will be as happy as Sven Eriksson to have a budget for new players. If this is the only way for the junta to achieve an exit from the coup, then they have to put their money behind it.