Many Thais think they are facing a dilemma. They want an election and yet they fear a return of the "old power clique".

While the general election tentatively slated for December 23 offers the best promise of putting Thailand back on the path to democracy, it also raises the spectre of a new round of political confrontation. The September 19 coup succeeded in ousting Thaksin Shinawatra from power, but failed to stamp out his political influence, especially among his supporters in most parts of the North and Northeast.

The military junta was given a taste of its own medicine in August when the referendum on a new constitution, which it hoped would put the final nail in Thaksin's coffin, turned out to be a major embarrassment. The more than 10 million votes against the charter were certainly no accident. They were the result of a carefully orchestrated and well-funded campaign by forces still loyal to the former leader.

Besides being a slap in the face for the Council for National Security (CNS), more significantly the large "no vote" also served as a disturbing prelude to the general election. The results of the referendum demonstrated beyond any doubt that with his political clout and wealth largely intact despite efforts by the junta to clip his financial wings, Thaksin is still a force to be reckoned with.

The choice of political firebrand Samak Sundaravej as leader of the People Power Party (PPP) was also a well-calculated move. Samak, with his no-holds-barred political style, is exactly the kind of politician that Thaksin needs, both to hold the reincarnation of his defunct Thai Rak Thai together and to confront the military junta. And Samak has no qualms about admitting that he is serving as "Thaksin's nominee" - an unmistakable message to Thaksin loyalists that the former prime minister is closely watching them from thousands of miles away.

It's an open secret that huge amounts of money have been continually channelled from outside the country to pro-Thaksin forces to sustain the loyalty of constituencies in the North and Northeast. And it shouldn't surprise anyone that the PPP will be going into the general election with the most formidable war chest.

Thaksin might be down, but he is definitely far from out. Despite all the efforts of the coup-makers to discredit the former leader, most voters in the North and Northeast are still oblivious to the charges of corruption and abuse of power that have been levelled against Thaksin and his associates. Both the junta and the Surayud government have obviously done a poor job in communicating with rural constituents.

The rejuvenated ex-Thai Rak Thai loyalists and their well-oiled network of canvassers have been far more effective in painting Thaksin as a victim of a political vendetta. All indications are that the closer the election gets, the more confident the PPP is in its ability to fend off any threat in the country's two biggest regions.

Despite years of attempted political reforms, money still decides election outcomes. And the upcoming election will be the same. And guess who has all the money in the world and is willing to spend it to buy his political resurrection?

Even political groups and parties opposed to Thaksin admit that all the bad publicity about him in the Thai media has done little to put a dent in his popularity. And given his willingness to expend his wealth, the likelihood is that the PPP will emerge with the most number of seats in the election. But with most other political parties allied against it, it's still a question of whether it will be in a position to lead a coalition government.

But that kind of political scenario is already scary enough for those who foresee another period of political instability or even confrontation. A PPP victory at the polls would be seen as Thaksin's political vindication. It would provide him with the legitimacy he needs to reclaim his political role.

However, one cannot entirely blame Thaksin and his political loyalists for the political dilemma the country may be facing. The junta and the Surayud government had their chance to dismantle Thaksin's political machine and wean those in the rural areas away from his populist appeal. But they were simply inept at carrying out the job.

The various political parties, particularly the Democrats, have also failed miserably to capitalise on Thaksin's political misfortune. Their lack of leadership and credible platforms has disappointed many who are looking for a potential alternative to Thaksin's rule. The bickering between the Surayud government and the military-appointed National Legislative Assembly has only made things worse.

Postponing the election - a move advocated by many still haunted by Thaksin's ghost - will do little to alter the political course. At the end of day, the old saying that people get the government they deserve still holds true.